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INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
ANNUAL CASE LAW UPDATE AND COMMENTARY
Kathryn E. Fort and Adrian T. Smith1
I.   ABSTRACT
There are, on average, 200 appellate cases dealing with the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) annually—including published
and unpublished opinions.2 There are usually around thirty reported
state appellate court cases involving ICWA issues every year. Before
last year, no legal scholar had published a systematic overview of
the cases on appeal that analyzed the parties involved, the issues on
appeal, and the trends present in these cases. For the second year
in a row, this article seeks to fill that void.
This article provides a comprehensive catalogue of 2018
ICWA jurisprudence from across all fifty states. Designed as a quick
reference for the ICWA practitioner, this article also summarizes
key case decisions that have interpreted the law in meaningful,
significant, or surprising ways and tracks current attempts by
ICWA’s opponents to overturn the law piece-by-piece and in its
entirety. By providing an overview of last year’s ICWA cases, this
article is meant to keep practitioners up-to-date so that they can be
effective in the juvenile courtroom without having to sort through
and read dozens of cases published across all fifty jurisdictions.
II.  

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Congress recognized “that the States, exercising
their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings
through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families,” and that this led to “an alarmingly high percentage of
1

Kathryn E. Fort is the Director of the Indian Law Clinic at Michigan State
University College of Law and runs the ICWA Appellate Project. She graduated
from MSU College of Law in 2005. Adrian (Addie) T. Smith graduated from
Washington University in St. Louis Schools of Law and Social Work in 2012.
She was previously the Government Affairs and Advocacy Staff Attorney at the
Nation Indian Child Welfare Association.
2
Data on file with the authors and journal.
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Indian families [being] broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and
private agencies.”3 To address this nation-wide issue, Congress
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).4 ICWA creates
“minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children
from their families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes” that state administrative and judicial bodies must
follow.5
Because of ICWA’s fundamental structure—being a federal
law interpreted and litigated in state courts—tracking appellate
litigation interpreting the Act is relatively easy. Indeed, state court
decisions make up the body of ICWA case law and have influence
beyond the state in which they are decided. That is because state
courts often turn to “sister jurisdictions” when deciding matters
related to ICWA precisely because it is a federal law applied across
the states.6 For this reason, unlike other child dependency attorneys,
an ICWA practitioner has to stay up to date on decisions from across
the country in addition to decisions in their home state. This can be
particularly difficult for those with an active caseload and limited
access to legal databases, such as tribes’ in-house ICWA attorneys,
parents’ attorneys, and child advocates (including guardians ad
litem or children’s attorneys). It has become increasingly evident
that practitioners are in need of an annual published account of the
3

25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)–(5) (2012).
See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2012). For an overview of ICWA’s provisions,
requirements, and an introduction to the law, see Native American Rights Fund,
A Practical Guide to the Indian Child Welfare Act, available at
https://www.narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/ [http://perma.cc/5WSH-6QUA]; B.J.
Jones et al., The Indian Child Welfare Act Handbook (2008); National Council
of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Indian Child Welfare Act Judicial
Benchbook, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/ICWABenchbook
[http://perma.cc/DGB3-2ZPV]
5
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012).
6
See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.G. (In re C.G.), 317 P.3d 936, 945 n.11
(Or. Ct. App. 2014) (looking to decisions of sister states when interpreting
ICWA); State ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. Marlene C. (In re
Esther V.), 248 P.3d 863, 871 (N.M. 2011); In re Welfare of R.S., 805 N.W.2d
44, 65 (2011); People ex rel. A.R., 310 P.3d 1007, 1014 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012);
In re Welfare of S.R.K, 911 N.W.2d 821, 829 (Minn. 2018). See also In re N.B.,
199 P.3d 16, 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting cases from the “several states”
regarding ICWA’s application in step-parent adoptions), which was cited to in
In re Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492 (Wash. 2016) (applying the
Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act to step-parent adoptions), which
was further cited to and discussed in S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 574
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (applying ICWA to a private abandonment and step-parent
adoption proceeding).
4
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cases.7 Although much of family law is under the purview of the
states,8 ICWA, which is grounded in the federal government’s trust
responsibility to tribes and Indian people, holds a unique place in
child welfare jurisprudence.9 It is a federal law that must be
implemented in state courts—jurisdictions where there can be a
great deal of legislative diversity.10
ICWA’s provisions apply when there is an Indian child11 and
a child custody proceeding.12 The law’s requirements include the
following: States must inquire into the membership status of a tribal
child,13 provide tribes and parents notice in child welfare
7

Prof. Fort runs the ICWA Appellate Project at MSU College of Law. In 2017,
her clinic handled inquiries in sixty-three different cases from more than thirty
tribes handling cases in more than twenty states. In 2018, the clinic handled
additional inquires in more than forty cases from more than thirty tribes.
Additionally, for the past few years, Prof. Fort has collecting ICWA cases and
discussing them online, but the need for a formal compendium has become
increasingly obvious based on the inquiries from around the country both
authors receive on a weekly basis. See Turtletalk ICWA Appellate Project,
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/icwa/ [http://perma.cc/W4E5-8KMT].
8
But see Jill Elaine Hasday, Family Law Reimagined (2014) (arguing family
law has long been the purview of the federal government and the states, despite
Supreme Court dicta stating otherwise).
9
See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1)–(2) (2012).
10
While the federal funding provisions under Title IV-E of the Social Security
Act require states to pass certain standards for foster care placements and
termination of parental rights, there are many areas of state law that vary by
state. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–679c (2012). See, e.g., Child Welfare Information
Gateway, Wash., D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, Children’s
Bureau, Consent to Adoption, (2017) available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/consent.pdf [http://perma.cc/VL7F22FH]; Child Welfare Information Gateway, Wash., D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs, Children’s Bureau, Representation of Children in Child
Abuse and Neglect Proceedings (2014)
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/represent.pdf [http://perma.cc/4AUN8Z7S]; Child Welfare Information Gateway, Wash., D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs, Children’s Bureau, Rights of Unmarried Fathers (2014),
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3KUP-DU3G]; Child Welfare Information Gateway, Wash.,
D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, Children’s Bureau, Definition of
Child Abuse and Neglect (2016)
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf [http://perma.cc/BGJ3883Z]. Even in an area where state law is arguably quite similar—child abuse
and neglect cases, for example—the vocabulary across the states varies
tremendously. Indeed, the authors of this article debated whether to call them
“child abuse and neglect cases” (Michigan) or “child dependency cases”
(Oregon).
11
25 U.S.C. 1903(4) (2012) (a child under the age of eighteen who either is a
tribal member or is both eligible for tribal citizenship and the biological child of
a tribal member).
12
Id. at (1).
13
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012).

	
  

23

	
  
proceedings,14 and ensure that tribes are given the opportunity to
intervene in the proceedings15 or transfer jurisdiction to the tribal
court.16 The party removing a child or terminating parental rights
must provide active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian
family17 and present testimony of a qualified expert witness
supporting such a decision18 before placing an Indian child in foster
care or terminating the parental rights over an Indian child.
Additionally, proceedings under ICWA involve increased burdens
of proof,19 among other things.
ICWA has been interpreted to apply in conjunction with, and
in some instances on top of, state child welfare laws.20 When an
Indian child, as defined in the law, is subject to a child custody
proceeding, also defined in the law, ICWA’s protections and
standards must be implemented by state courts.21 Though ICWA is
not a unique federal intrusion into state family dependence
proceedings, it is one of the few laws of this kind that are not
required to be incorporated into state law in order for a state to
receive federal funding. Many states have incorporated parts of the
law, while a few have passed comprehensive Indian child welfare
acts.22
To best serve the active practitioner, this article first
provides an overview of related case data, including information on
where there were reported (and unreported) decisions interpreting
14

Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (2012).
16
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012).
17
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012)
18
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)–(f) (2012).
19
Id.
20
See In re K.S.D., 904 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 2017); Valerie M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 198 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Ariz. 2009) (collecting cases).
21
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012). See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42 (1989) (applying ICWA in ‘child custody
proceedings’ involving an ‘Indian child’ as defined by the Act).
22
See, e.g., Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §
712B.1–41 (2012) (comprehensive state ICWA); Minnesota Indian Family
Preservation Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 260.751–835 (1999) (comprehensive state
ICWA); Washington Indian Child Welfare Act, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.38.010–
190 (2011) (comprehensive state ICWA); Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1501–1516 (2015) (comprehensive state ICWA); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-453 (2017) (merely requiring compliance with ICWA);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-126 (2002) (requiring compliance with ICWA and
specifically-inquiry, notification, determination, transfer to tribal court); Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 419A.116, 419B.090, 118, 150, 171, 185, 192, 340, 365, 366, 452,
476, 498, 500, 875, 878, 923 (2001) (Imbedding ICWA standards in relevant
areas across Oregon’s dependency code).
15
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ICWA, what provisions courts most commonly interpreted, and
what themes arose in 2018. The article then provides a descriptive
commentary on a handful of 2018 state and federal cases that best
illuminate the described themes. It closes with a full compendium
of 2018 ICWA cases, which is topically organized for those
practitioners who may not have access to this information.
III.  

SUMMARY OF THE DATA AND NATIONAL TRENDS

Every year, there are usually around thirty reported state
appellate court cases involving ICWA issues. However, until
recently, there has never been a systematic look at the cases on
appeal that includes an analysis of who is appealing and what the
primary issues are on appeal. Legal databases make both published
and unpublished cases more readily available to the practitioner and
scholar, but the sheer volume of cases can be overwhelming. The
authors of this article read every case as they were released through
daily alerts from Westlaw, LexisNexis, and the Alaska court system.
Each case was coded by the primary ICWA topic on appeal.23 The
cases were also coded with the date, the court, the child’s named
tribe,24 the parties involved, and the court’s decision.25 These
numbers do not include federal challenges to the law, which are
discussed separately below under Cases of Note.
Because of time limits and capacity, the ICWA topics on
appeal have been coded by only one of this article’s authors. This
means there are some cases that cross topics and might be coded
differently by a different reader. Therefore, the count of topics is not
meant to be statistically sound, but rather provide general guidance
concerning the trends on appeal. The general elements of each topic
are listed below:
Inquiry26 considers whether the case primarily discusses social
services or the court’s failure to ask questions about a parent’s
23

Active efforts, burden of proof, qualified expert witness, inquiry, notice,
transfer to tribal court, foster care proceeding, termination of parental rights,
guardianship, Indian custodian, intervention, appealability, appointment of
counsel.
24
In notice cases, often there are a number of tribes identified as potential tribes
for the child. We collect up to three named tribes and put them in the order they
appear in the case. We publish the first named tribe here, unless the court
determines the Indian child’s tribe later in the opinion.
25
Affirm, remand, reverse, dismissed
26
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (2017).
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indication that they may be American Indian. This may include
cases where notice was sent without enough information, but the
included cases are limited to those in which the issue is a lack of
inquiry rather than incorrect notice.
Notice27 is at issue any time there is discussion of the adequacy of
notice to tribes. This includes notice that goes to the wrong tribe, the
wrong address, not enough tribes, or was not updated with new
information.
The nature of foster care proceedings28are analyzed to determine
what proceedings are implicated under ICWA.
Removal29: opinions involving the standards, including evidentiary,
of the removal of a child from the home. These may include both
emergency and non-emergency proceedings.
Termination of Parental Rights30: When a parent or tribe challenges
more than one element of an ICWA termination of parental rights,
including active efforts, qualified expert witness, or the burden of
proof.
Active Efforts31: When a parent challenges the active efforts finding
in either a foster care or termination proceeding.
Qualified Expert Witness (QEW)32: When a parent challenges the
qualified expert witness testimony in either a foster care or
termination proceeding.
Indian Child33: When a tribe has been identified, and the court is
trying to determine whether the child is an Indian child under
ICWA’s definition. This will include reason to know the child is an
Indian child cases, which are separate from faulty notice cases.
Placement Preferences34: the party appealing is contesting the
placement order of one or more children.

27

25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §. 23.111 (2018).
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2018).
29
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.113–
114 (2018).
30
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.120–123 (2018).
31
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)–(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.2, 23.120 (2018).
32
25 U.S.C. § 1912 (e)–(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.122 (2018).
33
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.108–109 (2018).
34
25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.129–132 (2018).
28
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Jurisdiction35: When the state court is determining whether it has
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Transfer to Tribal Court36: when a party appeals an order either
denying or granting a transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court.
Guardianship37: When the court determines whether ICWA applies
to a guardianship.
Consent to Termination38: When a parent appeals an order
terminating parental rights that involved the parent’s consent to the
termination.
Appointment of Counsel39: When the case primarily addresses the
right to appointment of counsel under ICWA.
Burden of Proof40: when a party challenges either the clear and
convincing evidence standard or the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of ICWA.
Appealability41: when a court determines whether an order in an
ICWA case is appealable.
Tribal Customary Adoption42: Cases interpreting California’s Tribal
Customary Adoption statute.
As the numbers show, ICWA is litigated more often than
non-practitioners might imagine. State courts of appeal interpret the
law across the country at a rate of once every other day. There are,
on average, 200 appellate cases annually—including published and
unpublished opinions.43 In 2017, there were 214 appealed ICWA

35

25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.110 (2018).
25 U.S.C. § 1911(2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.115–119 (2018).
37
25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2018).
38
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.124–
128j (2018); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.136–137 (2018).
39
25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2012).
40
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)–(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.121 (2018).
41
25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2012).
42
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.24 (West 2013).
43
Data on file with the authors and journal.
36
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cases. 44 Thirty-four were published.45 In 2018, there were 206
appealed ICWA cases, but only forty-nine were published.46 As we
noted last year, the small number of reported ICWA cases
understates the amount of appeals, and the lack of reporting leaves
important analysis and guidance as non-binding.47
Supreme Courts in seven different states issued reported
ICWA-related opinions this year, including Alaska (three cases),
Montana (seven cases), South Dakota (two cases), Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota.48 Meanwhile, Alaska had
another eight unreported decisions, Montana another three, and
Nevada issued one. The remaining opinions, published and
unpublished, were authored by states’ intermediate Courts of
Appeal. The number of ICWA appellate cases varied significantly
by jurisdiction, as did the number of cases which the courts chose to
report.49
While unpublished opinions cannot be used for precedent,
the authors include those cases in the numbers here to reflect the
actual litigation practitioners encounter. As always, the authors have
44

Cases are collected from both Westlaw and Lexis over the course of the year
via case alerts that collect cases from all fifty states and using the search terms
“Indian Tribe”, “American Indian”, “Native American”. The cases are sorted by
case name, the date, the court, the state, whether the case is reported or not, the
top two issues, up to three named tribes, the outcome of the case, and who
appealed the case.
45
Data on file with the authors and journal.
46
2018 Data on file with authors and journal.
47
See Kathryn E. Fort, Indian Child Welfare Act Annual Case Law Update and
Commentary, 6 AM. INDIAN L.J. 32, 36 (2018); Matter of Dependency of K.S.,
199 Wash. App. 1034, 2017 WL 2634788 (Div. I June 19, 2017); New Jersey
Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. E.W., 2018 WL 3384284 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 12, 2018) (discussing equal protection challenges to
ICWA).
48
It is important to note that Alaska, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota,
do not have or use their court of appeals for child welfare cases; appeals are
taken directly to the state supreme court. See Section III for a summary of these
cases. That said, last year Montana only had two reported cases.
49
Yet again, California leads the states with 125 cases, but only nine were
reported. California has both the most number of cases, and one of the lowest
percentages of unreported cases at about seven percent. Alaska is second with
eleven opinions, three reported; followed by Montana with ten opinions, and
seven reported. Michigan had eight opinions but reported only two, while
Colorado issued 8 opinions and published all eight. Ohio, Arizona, and Texas
each issued four opinions, and reported two, one, and two, respectively. Illinois
issued three unreported opinions. Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, and Washington
each issued two unreported opinions. Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota each
issued two reported decisions. Finally, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada
issued one unpublished opinion each, and Minnesota, Nebraska, and North
Dakota each published their one decision.
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only summarized reported cases, but practitioners may want to keep
in mind that unreported ones may still have significant legal research
and reasoning useful to their cases. Last year, we speculated on the
reasons why there may be so many unpublished decisions but did
not land on an answer. However, most of these unreported cases
address the issue of inquiry and notice—an area so common and
well-established that there may no longer be a need to report these
opinions.
Similar to what we saw last year, the vast majority of this
year’s active efforts cases—eleven out of thirteen—were
unreported.50 This may reflect how fact specific most active efforts
cases are. There is, however, a drawback to this lack of reporting
because the determinations of what active efforts consists of remain
inconsistent. In thirteen cases in eight different states, only one was
remanded for the trial court to make specific active efforts
findings.51
In addition, a little more than half of the termination of
parental rights cases were reported.52 These cases concern multiple
aspects of the findings that are required for termination, including
active efforts, the burden of proof, and qualified expert witnesses.
In every single case, the termination was affirmed. Finally, there
were more placement preference cases than last year, and although
only two of these cases were published, nine were decided.
The most litigated issues were notice and inquiry,53
followed by active efforts, termination of parental rights (which
includes burden of proof issues), placement preferences, foster care
proceeding, tribal customary adoption, and determination of Indian
50

In re B.Y., 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2018); In re Adoption of Micah H., 918
N.W.2d 834 (Neb. 2018), Terry S. v. Superior Court, No. A148984, 2018 WL
300078 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018); In re K.R., No. A153781, 2018 WL
6428088 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018); In re D.R. Wolf, No. 343001, 2018 WL
6070462 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018); In re S.D.M., No. 78142-1-I, 2018
WL 5984147 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018); Jude M. v. State, 394 P.3d 543,
547 (Alaska 2017); Vanessa W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 17-0461,
2018 WL 2147213 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 10, 2018); Ronald H. v. State, No. S16725, 2018 WL 1611648 (Alaska Mar. 28, 2018); In re A.F., No. 17-0487,
2018 WL 1282575 (Mar. 13, 2018); In re C.P., No. F075660, 2018 WL 1045063
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2018); Janice H. v Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV
17-0343, 2018 WL 893981 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2018); Charles V. v. State,
No. S-16575, 2018 WL 913105 (Alaska Feb. 14, 2018).
51
In re B.Y., 393 Mont. 530, 432 P.3d 129 (2018);
52
Ten out of eighteen cases were reported.
53
Notice was the subject of litigation in eighty-six cases, and Inquiry was the
subject of litigation in forty-three cases.
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child.54 Of all the cases, seventy-nine or around forty percent were
reversed or remanded.55 This year exactly half of the notice cases
were remanded for proper notice (forty-two), and two were
reversed. Slightly more than half of the inquiry cases were remanded
as well (twenty). Fifty-seven different tribes were named as possible
tribes of the children in these cases. In twenty-six cases, the tribe
was unknown (the parent did not know name of his or her tribe). In
seventeen, the tribe was unnamed (the court did not record name of
tribe in the opinion).
There are a few trends worth noting this year. While the total
number of cases is down, the number of reported cases has increased
considerably given the small sample size. This indicates one reason
to distinguish published cases from unpublished cases; this way, the
count does not seem artificially inflated by the number of reported
cases. The types of cases remained generally the same as last year.
This year, not a single tribe appealed an ICWA case
reviewed by the author. While there are no clear statistical reasons
for this, the authors can provide some anecdotal ones based on their
experience. Many tribes simply do not have the capacity to take a
case up on appeal; either these tribes lack counsel or their counsel
does not have the capacity to take such a case up. In some cases, the
tribe or its outside counsel may either disagree with the appeal or
have interests adverse to the parent’s position. Tribal attorneys are
also often concerned about the duration of the appeals process and
the effect it may have on a child. In many cases, tribes are simply
never notified of an appeal by a parent. Even if a tribe does receive
notice of a case going up on appeal and wants to participate, finding
a local attorney for pro hac vice is incredibly difficult in some states.
The court or agency may also be unwilling to share even basic
information with the tribe if it considers that information to be
confidential. If a tribal attorney can get past all of that, many state
appellate court rules simply do not contemplate intervenor party
briefs at the appellate level, so tribes are forced to choose between
filing an amicus brief or attempting motion practice on appeal to
54

The numbers of cases for each category of litigation are as follows: Placement
Preferences (nine), Active Efforts (thirteen), Termination of Parental Rights
(eighteen), Indian Child (twelve), Tribal Customary Adoption (four), Transfer to
Tribal Court (one), and QEW (one).
55
Of the 206 total cases, seventy-four were remanded and five were reversed. Of
the forty-nine reported cases, twenty-five were affirmed; twenty-two were
remanded or reversed; one was dismissed; and one was affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
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ensure their status as a party. Unfortunately, without any tribal brief
on appeal, appellate courts often have no guidance concerning a
tribe’s position. The lack of a brief or participation is sometimes
misinterpreted as a lack of concern for the child or family or the
alignment of tribal and parental interests. In some decisions, the
court’s confusion is apparent and its ignorance of the tribe’s position
comes through in the opinion.
An additional trend this year is the increased number of cases
interpreting state laws that implement ICWA. California and
Michigan in particular had cases that rest heavily on interpretations
of state law.56 California’s tribal customary adoption law, a unique
state law that allows a state court to apply tribal law in the context
of an adoption, was interpreted four times by California state
courts.57 In addition, Michigan had a procedurally difficult and
complex case involving a father consenting to termination in the
face of a state termination hearing.58 The outcome of that case was
based exclusively on the Michigan Supreme Court’s reading of the
Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act rather than a reading of
ICWA. The cases summarized in Section III are only those in which
courts interpreted ICWA, but practitioners must be increasingly
aware of state-specific law holdings insofar as they apply to Indian
children.
Two states in particular had an uptick in the number of
opinions they issued—Montana and Colorado. In particular,
Colorado’s Court of Appeals issued a number of considered
opinions regarding inquiry and notice for which it provided specific
and detailed remand instructions.59 Remand instructions in child
welfare cases are particularly important and should be an area of
focus for ICWA appellate practitioners. The most obvious example
of a problematic reversal or remand on appeal was in Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl,60 after which no state court held a placement
hearing regarding the child’s best interest. Because a remand or
56

See In re J.Y., 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re A.S., 239
Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re Williams, 915 N.W.2d 328 (Mich.
2018).
57
In re J.Y., 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re A.S., 239
Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re L.S. 2018 WL 3371960 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 11, 2018); In re A.S., 2018 WL 3196529 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29,
2018).
58
Williams, 915 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. 2018)
59
In re J.L., 428 P.3d 612, 616–617 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
60
570 U.S. 637, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013)
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reversal can end up changing the placement of a child immediately,
appellate attorneys should consider providing specific instructions
in the conclusion portions of their briefs.61
Montana’s reported cases ran the gamut of ICWA issues,
including active efforts, the determination of who may be
considered an Indian child under the law, notice, and the termination
of parental rights. While the Montana court continued to apply
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl62 to its paternity cases, to the
detriment of Native fathers, it also applied the ICWA Regulations in
a fairly strict manner.63 Montana is also the location of a new ICWA
court in Yellowstone County.64 The court represents an attempt to
bring more collaboration between the state and local tribes to the
child welfare process when it involves Indian children. The court is
an attempt to treat all parties—parents, tribes, and children—with
the respect and consideration they deserve.
And finally, as had been the case since 2015, the federal
challenges to ICWA continue apace. Though standard ICWA
practice continues in state courts around the country, much of the
media coverage and national legal work has focused extensively on
cases out of Texas and Arizona. In particular, the facial challenge to
the law by the states of Texas, Indiana, and Louisiana is the greatest
threat to ICWA since its passage, though none of the arguments
made in that case are new or were unconsidered by Congress and
courts at the time of ICWA’s passage.
IV.  

CASES OF NOTE

The authors have chosen to highlight and summarize the
cases below because they present relevant issues, reflect trends in
litigation from across the country, and/or sit in a unique procedural
posture that reflects the current challenges to and interpretations of
61

Compare In re J.J.W., 902 N.W.2d 901, 919 (Mich. Ct. App.) (vacating an
order denying an adoption petition, vacating the order removing children from
petitioners with no instructions as to where the children should go), with In re
Williams 915 N.W.2d 328, 337(Mich. 2018) (describing where the children
should stay during the remand).
62
Matter of P.T.D., 424 P.3d 619 (Mont. 2018).
63
Matter of B.Y., 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2018).
64
Phoebe Tollefson, 1 year into Native foster care court, most kids taken from
unsafe homes are placed in tribe-approved homes, BILLINGS GAZETTE (July 24,
2018), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/year-into-native-foster-care-courtmost-kids-taken-from/article_d709c08a-b094-5ef2-b4f0-d5ff77b82762.html
[http://perma.cc/2LMX-3DGL]
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ICWA that are described above. They address issues of jurisdiction,
Indian child, qualified expert witnesses, and active efforts. A full
listing of the forty-nine published cases are in Section IV.
A. Federal Cases
Because ICWA is implemented in state court, federal cases
involving the law are usually rare. However, due to a series of
affirmative attacks on the law in federal court which started in 2015,
there have been a number of published federal opinions (from
district courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court) over the
past four years. This article includes published decisions from 2018
and notes concerning cases that are currently under appeal.65
Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F.Supp.3d 514 (N.D. Texas, 2018) (on
appeal to the Fifth Circuit as Brackeen v. Bernhardt, No.18-11479
(5th Cir. 2019)).
In this federal case, three state plaintiffs, Texas, Louisiana,
and Indiana, and a number of individual plaintiffs, including the
Brackeens, a couple from Texas looking to adopt a Navajo and
Cherokee child whose mother’s rights had been previously
terminated by the state; the Librettis, a couple from Nevada looking
to adopt a child from Ysleta del sur Pueblo and the child’s biological
mother; Ms. Hernandez, who would like to place her child with the
Librettis; and the Cliffords, a foster couple from Minnesota looking
to adopt a child who is a member of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe
Tribe sued the United States, seeking to have ICWA declared
unconstitutional. The named defendants are the United States
Department of the Interior and its Secretary Ryan Zinke; the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and its Director Bryan Rice; BIA Principal
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, John Tahsuda III; the United
States Department of Health and Human Services; and Secretary
Alex M. Azar II (each of the individual defendants are named in
their official capacities). Not long after the case was filed, four tribal
nations, Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinault Indian Nation,

65

The Ninth Circuit dismissed, in an unpublished memorandum decision, Carter
v. Tahsuda, No. 17-15839, 743 Fed.Appx. 823 (Aug. 6, 2018), cert petition
filed, Carter v. Sweeney, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 18-923 (Jan. 16,
2019).
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and Morongo Band of Mission Indians, moved to intervene as party
defendants.
The plaintiffs filed two amended complaints, and the federal
government and tribal intervenors both filed motions to dismiss. In
their opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for summary judgment. The court allowed briefing to move ahead
on the summary judgment. In addition to the parties stated above,
six states (California, Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon and
Washington) filed an amicus brief in support of the federal
government, as did 123 tribes and fourteen tribal organizations. The
State of Ohio and the Goldwater Institute filed amicus briefs on
behalf of the plaintiffs.
On October 4th, the court issued an opinion finding much of
ICWA unconstitutional and the ICWA regulations violative of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Most disturbingly, the court
held that ICWA violates the equal protection requirements of the
Fifth Amendment. The court found that “by deferring to tribal
membership eligibility standards based on ancestry, rather than
actual tribal affiliation, the ICWA’s jurisdictional definition of
‘Indian children’ uses ancestry as a proxy for race and therefore
‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”66 The
court then found that the statute failed the test under strict scrutiny
because it was overbroad; the court also held that the Act
“establishes standards that are unrelated to specific tribal interests
and applies those standards to potential Indian children” and is
therefore unconstitutional.67
Second, the court held that section 1915(a) of ICWA violates
the Non-Delegation Clause in Article I.68 Section 1915(a) allows for
tribes to set preferences concerning the placement of Indian children
that states must follow. The court held that, because tribes are not
federal actors and “[t]he power to change specifically enacted
Congressional priorities and impose them on third parties can only
be described as legislative”69 as opposed to regulatory, 1915(a)
impermissibly delegates legislative authority to tribes.
66

Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F.Supp.3d 514, 533–34 (N.D. Texas, 2018).
Id. at 535.
68
Id. at 536. The non-delegation clause generally stands for the proposition that
Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority to another branch of
government, such as the executive branch. As Indians and Indian tribes are only
mentioned in two clauses of the Constitution, the non-delegation clause
obviously does not address delegation to Indian tribes.
69
Id. at 537.
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Third, the court held that 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–23 and 1951–
52 violate the Tenth Amendment. The court found that, because
those provisions “require the States to apply federal standards to
state created claims,”70 they are impermissibly commandeering state
courts and agencies to administer federal law. The court added,
“While Supremacy Clause preemption may apply to a conflict
between state and ‘federal law that regulates the conduct of private
actors,’ it cannot rescue a law that directly regulates states.”71
Finally, the Court held that the BIA lacked the authority to
promulgate the 2016 ICWA Regulations and that doing so violated
the APA.72 The court noted that in 1979, the BIA found that it lacks
authority to promulgate regulations. The court then noted that the
BIA did not adequately address its authority to promulgate
regulations in 2016 despite extensive regulatory discussion on this
issue that preceded the issuance of the regulations. The court then
stated, “Because the BIA does not explain its change in position over
its authority to ‘carry out the provisions’ and apply the ICWA—and
therefore its authority to issue binding regulations—the Court finds
those regulations remain not necessary to carry out the ICWA.”73
For those reasons, the court held that the BIA “exceeded the
statutory authority Congress granted to it to enforce the ICWA”74
when it promulgated binding regulations (as opposed to advisory
guidelines) and, therefore, violated the APA in doing so.
The court also found that ICWA does not violate a
foster parent’s substantive due process rights.75 The court
reasoned that foster parents do not have a constitutionally
protected right to an intimate relationship with their foster
child. No party has appealed this issue.
The intervenor tribes moved to stay the opinion of the district
court pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit. The tribes pointed out the
decision is contrary to precedent on all grounds, including basic
precepts of standing and mootness, federal Indian law,
administrative law, and constitutional law. The tribes also noted the
decision is specifically contrary to Congressional intent and that the
application of the decision would cause considerable confusion
70

Id. at 539.
Id. at 541.
72
Id. at 542.
73
Id. at 543.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 546.
71
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nationwide.76 The district court denied the stay77 and the tribes both
filed for a stay and appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit.78 They
were later joined in the appeal by the federal government.79 The
Fifth Circuit granted the stay.80 At the time of this writing, the Fifth
Circuit case has been briefed and oral arguments are scheduled for
March 13, 2019.81 In addition, the Navajo Nation filed to intervene
in the Fifth Circuit, and was granted intervenor status as well.
While the State of Texas attempted to hold its attorneys and
courts to the district court’s decision,82 no state court has agreed with
the reasoning or agreed to apply the holding to other cases. As a state
court in Texas noted,
The Department contends the . . . [district court’s]
order render’s J.R.M’s complaints moot, but the
order does not indicate that the plaintiffs challenged
the specific ICWA provisions at issue in this case.
Further, the Brackeen case may be appealed and
ICWA has previously been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court. . . . Therefore, we will
address the merits of the issues raised on appeal.83
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2018). In
this long-running federal court case challenging both ICWA and
due process violations in child welfare cases in Pennington
76

Opposed Mot. for Expedited Consideration and Mot. to Stay Pending Appeal
of Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinault Indian Nation, and Morongo Band
of Mission Indians, Brackeen v. Zinke No. 17-cv-858 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2018).
77
Order, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 17-cv-858 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2018).
78
Mot. to Stay Pending Appeal, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Nov.
19, 2018).
79
Notice of Appeal, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018).
80
Per Curiam Order, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018).
81
All of the briefing is available at https://turtletalk.blog/icwa/texas-v-zinkedocuments-and-additional-materials/texas-v-zinke-fifth-circuit-document/
[http://perma.cc/2Y9F-HN2U]
82
Inapplicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act to Texas Child Custody
Proceedings Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. 51 (2018),
http://texaschildrenscommission.gov/media/83949/oag-icwa-ruling-letter-todfps_10252018.pdf. [http://perma.cc/E4YE-7JVD] cf. Resource Letter: For
Judges and Attorneys Handling Child Protective Services Cases,
https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Important-Information-for-Judges-andAttorneys-Handling-CPS-Cases.html?soid=1129497844492&aid=5xaJ5st1Gcw
[http://perma.cc/PTF8-3JJG].
83
In re A.M., 2018 WL 6583392, 2 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018). See also In
re M.D., 920 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 2018).
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County, South Dakota, the Eighth Circuit held that the Younger
abstention doctrine applied and vacated and remanded with
instructions to dismiss.
This case was a class action lawsuit brought by the Oglala
Sioux and Rosebud Sioux Tribe, as well as Madonna Pappan and
Lisa Young, mothers who had their children removed by the State
and eventually returned to them. The plaintiffs claimed that the
initial 48-hour hearing held after the State removed a child from the
home violated both ICWA and fundamental due process rights,
including a lack of notice and the right to cross examine witnesses.
The district court agreed and granted declaratory and injunctive
relief. The Eighth Circuit found that under Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415 (1979), the State’s emergency hearings were of the type that is
due Younger abstention. While the plaintiffs argued that the relief
sought was prospective and that there was no opportunity to address
the federal claims in those hearings, the Court noted that there were
on-going emergency hearings during the pendency of the federal
proceeding and that “[t]he relief requested would interfere with the
state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to comply
with numerous procedural requirements at future 48-hour
hearings.”84
B. State Cases
In re L.D., 391 Mont. 33 (2018).
In this Montana case, the initial petition stated that “to the best of
the petitioners belief” the child “is an Indian child for the purposes
of [ICWA].”85 At the initial show-cause hearing, the parents both
stated that they did not believe the child to be eligible for tribal
enrollment, and the child’s mother (who was herself enrolled) stated
that she had unsuccessfully attempted to enroll the child.86 The
agency remained uncertain, stating that it would further investigate,
and asked that the court proceed under ICWA.87 The tribe was

84

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2018), appeal
docketed, No. 18-1245 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2019)
85
In re L.D., 391 Mont. 33, 34, 414 P.3d 768 (2018).
86
Id. at 35.
87
Id.
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notified regarding the case and advised the agency that it would not
intervene or assume jurisdiction.88
Nearly a year after the show-cause hearing, the agency filed
a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, stating that the
department “believed” that the child was “subject to [ICWA],” and
served the tribe.89 The tribe did not appear at the termination
proceeding, but an expert witness testified and the court’s findings
were made pursuant to termination standards in section 1912 of
ICWA.90 Four months later, the agency filed a termination petition
against the mother.91 At the termination proceeding, the State
asserted—for the first time—that the child was not an “Indian
child.” When the mother did not object, the court determined that
the standards of ICWA did not apply to the termination
proceeding.92 For this reason, the agency did not present an expert
witness and the findings made by the judge that supported the
termination of the mother’s parental rights did not comply with
section 1912’s requirements.93 The mother appealed.
The appellate court found that when there is reason to
believe that a child is an Indian child, as there was here, the agency
has a “threshold duty to obtain a conclusive determination from an
Indian tribe of tribal eligibility” prior to proceeding with a
termination.94 It further noted that a parent cannot waive the
application of ICWA—for only a tribe can determine its
membership and thus, the application of the law.95 The appellate
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Id.
Id. at 35-36.
90
Id. at 36.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 37.
94
Id. at 40.
95
Id. at 41.
The Supreme Court of Montana added the following:
While we appreciate the difficult position in which the District
Court found itself as a result of the parties’ imprudent
agreement or acquiescence that ICWA did not apply, it was
ultimately the Court’s responsibility to demand and ensure
strict compliance with ICWA and due process of law
regardless of the parties’ invitation and escort down the
proverbial garden path. Under the circumstances of this case,
we hold that the District Court erred and abused its discretion
by proceeding to terminate Mother’s rights * * * without a
conclusive tribal determination of [the child’s] membership
status and eligibility.
89
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court then reversed the decision and remanded it for the appropriate
determination regarding ICWA’s applicability.96
J.W.E. v. State, 419 P.3d 374 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018)(In re
J.W.E.).
In this Oklahoma termination of parental rights case, the agency
caseworker testified that at the time of the trial, January 23, 2017,
they had received letters from the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes and
the Choctaw Nation stating that the children were not eligible for
enrollment.97 The mother also explained that, while she was a
member of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, her children were not
eligible for membership in that tribe.98 She also stated that until she
became an established member of the Choctaw tribe,99 her children
would also be ineligible for membership in that tribe. 100 At the time
of the termination trial, the mother had testified that she was enrolled
as a member of the Choctaw Nation and had filed Choctaw
enrollment paperwork for her children.101 In fact, the mother
described in great detail the numerous conversations she had had
with the Choctaw child welfare and enrollment departments; the
efforts she had made to obtain the necessary information, including
birth certificates and death certificates, to apply for tribal enrollment
for her children and herself; the fact that enrollment applications had
been submitted; and that it typically takes the Choctaw Nation about
three months to make a decision.102
On January 31, 2017, the trial court (pursuant to a jury
decision) terminated the mother’s parental rights.103 The order
terminating her rights stated that the court had previously found that
the children were not Indian children for the purposes of ICWA.104
Shortly after the announcement of the jury verdict, the
mother received notice that the children had been enrolled in the

96

Id. at 41.
J.W.E. v. State, 419 P.3d 374, 376 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018)(In re J.W.E.).
98
Id. at 375.
99
Based on the explanation in the record, this meant that although she was a
member of the Choctaw Tribe, her enrollment in Cheyanne Arapaho precluded
her from receiving benefits from Choctaw Nation. Id. at 375.
100
Id. at 376.
101
Id. at 375.
102
Id. at 375–76.
103
Id. at 376.
104
Id.
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Choctaw Nation and that their membership had been certified by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs on January 10, 2017, and by Choctaw
Nation on January 20, 2017.105 The mother promptly filed a motion
for a new trial asserting that “because the children were enrolled
members prior to and at the time of trial, all proceedings, including
the trial, were subject to [ICWA] and [the] Oklahoma Indian Child
Welfare Act” and that none of the requirements of those statutes had
been followed.106 The trial court denied the mother’s motion and
she appealed.107
The appellate court began its opinion by reciting the
language from section 1912(a) of ICWA which requires notice when
there is “reason to know” that a child is an Indian child and citing to
George v. Traylor, 68 Va. App. 343, 808 S.E.2d 541 (2017), which
states that the quoted language “is a clear indication that Congress
intended the notice provisions to be effective in situations where
there was still question as to whether the child is an Indian child.”108
Then, after extensively reviewing the relevant 2016
Guidelines and the Federal Regulations, the court concluded that, in
spite of the Choctaw Nation’s earlier letters, the mother’s detailed
testimony at the termination trial was sufficient to put the court on
notice that there was reason to know that these children were Indian
children and that ICWA applied.109 Further, the appellate court
found support from an Oklahoma case, In re M.H.C., 381 P.3d 710
(Okla. 2016)—a case in which the court held that “ICWA applies
prospectively to a proceeding when the record establishes [that] the
child meets ICWA’s definition of Indian child”—for its holding that
that the date an individual gains membership is the date ICWA
becomes applicable.110 Here, the court noted the relevant date,
January 20, 2017, was before the commencement of the termination
trial, January 23, 2017.111 For those reasons, the appellate court
reversed the decision to deny the mother a new trial.

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 378.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 380.
111
Id. at 381. The court also clarified that ICWA became applicable on the date
of enrollment and therefore it did not apply retrospectively even though the case
began years earlier in 2011. Id.
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In re A.P., 818 S.E.2d 396 (2018).
At the abuse and neglect adjudication for this North Carolina
case, the court admitted into evidence a form indicating that the
mother and child have “American Indian Heritage” within the
“Cherokee” and “Bear Foot” tribes.112 The mother’s counsel
brought this form to the court’s attention and argued that the hearing
should be continued because the tribe had not received notice
pursuant to ICWA.113 The trial court proceeded with the hearing,
indicating that it had already made a finding that ICWA was not
applicable in its non-secure/temporary custody order.114
The court of appeals found that the record was sufficient to
“put the trial court on notice and provided ‘reason to know that an
‘Indian child’ [was] involved.’” 115 The trial court was therefore
required to direct the agency to send a notification letter to the tribe
before proceeding.116 The appellate court reversed the decision and
remanded to ensure that “ICWA’s notice and other mandatory
requirements are met.”117
In re Beers, Nos. 341100–1, 2018 WL 4339705 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 11, 2018).
In this Michigan termination of parental rights case, the court
terminated the father’s parental rights under state law and the
mother’s parental rights under the requirements of ICWA and the
Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), reasoning that
ICWA only applied to the mother who had Indian heritage.118 The
mother119 and father appealed.
112

In re A.P., 818 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2018).
Id. at 398–400.
114
Id. at 400.
115
Id.
116
Id. Interestingly, the court noted that because of ICWA’s application, notice
and the tribe’s response was of particular importance because it could deprive
the court of subject matter jurisdiction—not just because it could require a
variety of different protections in state court. Id.
117
Id. at 400-01.
118
In Re Beers, Nos. 341100–1, 2018 WL 4339705 *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11,
2018).
119
On appeal, the mother made fact-based arguments that the evidence was
insufficient to show that the agency had provided reasonable efforts and that
continued custody of her child would likely result in serious emotional or
physical harm. Id. at *11. These arguments were unremarkable—and therefore
not summarized here. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the termination
of her rights under ICWA and MIFPA. Id. at *11-12.
113
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The appellate court found that there was no doubt that the
child was an “Indian child” as defined by the Act.120 It also noted
that the father who had acknowledged that he was the child’s
biological father by signing an affidavit of parentage, was a “parent”
as defined by ICWA and MIFPA.121 The State conceded that ICWA
and MIFPA should have applied to the father’s proceeding and the
case was remanded to allow the trial court to apply the relevant
provisions of ICWA and MIFPA.122
The appellate court, however, raised the issue of whether
ICWA section 1912(f) and MIFPA MCL 712B.15(4), which state
that “no termination of parental rights may be ordered in the absence
of a determination…[and] that continued custody of the child by the
parent…is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child,” applied to this case because, as is required under
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013),
the father never had legal custody of the child.123 The Michigan
appellate court noted that although the majority opinion required a
parent to have physical or legal custody for section 1912(f) to apply,
Justice Breyer’s concurrence concluded that the decision was factspecific and that the father in that case not only lacked custody of
his child but also never lived with or cared for her.124 For those
reason, Breyer stated that different facts—e.g. regular visitation or
satisfactory payment of child support by a non-custodial parent—
could lead to a different conclusion.125 The Michigan court also
noted that it was unclear whether the Supreme Court intended the
requirement of physical custody to necessarily entail legal custody
or if that requirement could be met when “a custodial-like

120

Id.
ICWA defines parent as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child
or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including
adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where
paternity has not been acknowledged or established.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9)
(1978); see also MIFPA MCL 712B. 1-41 (stating the same).
122
Beers, No. 341100-1, 2018 WL 4339705 at *5, 10. The State also argued
that under plain error review the trial court’s decision should be affirmed and
that in any rate the decision can be upheld, even under the ICWA and MIFPA
standards. Id. at *9. The court found that there was no preservation issue
requiring plain error review and that to otherwise affirm would require
impermissible fact-finding by the appellate court that the court refused to do. Id.
123
Id. at *5-6
124
Id. at *8.
125
Id.
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environment existed on a practical level absent any technical
custodial rights.”126
The Michigan court then determined that the facts in this
case were dissimilar from those discussed in Baby Girl because here
the father had acknowledged his paternity and lived with and cared
for the child for a period of time. This meant that the State’s
intervention had “discontinued the custodial arrangement that had
existed with respect to [the child], if not in law, in practice,”
rendering ICWA section 1912(f) and MIFPA MCL 712B.15(4)
applicable to the termination proceeding.127
Finally, the court noted that although the active efforts
provisions of ICWA section 1912(d) and MIFPA MCL 712B.14(3)
only apply to the “breakup” of an Indian family, here the family was
previously intact and for similar reasons those sections apply in spite
of the decision in Baby Girl, which stated that custody was a
necessary prerequisite for the application of those provisions.128
In re E.R., No. 17CA0460, 2018 WL 1959477 (Colo. App. Apr.
19 2018).129
In this Colorado case the child was born six weeks
premature130 and the agency sought and received emergency
custody after the hospital reported that it could not locate the parents
to take him home. 131 The agency then filed a dependency and
126

Id. at 8
Id.
128
Id. at *10. The court also distinguished this case from a Michigan case that
found Baby Girl applicable, In re S.D., 236 Mich. App. 240, 599 N.W. 2d 772
(1999). In that case, there was no agency intervention and the family had been
living apart for quite some time before the termination proceeding—so the
appellate court found that the family had “already broken up by the time the
termination proceedings were initiated.” Id. at *9. Here, the court reasoned
reunification services were necessary because the State had intervened but the
family had otherwise been and would be intact. Id.
129
People In Interest of E.R., also discusses a state law question regarding the
admissibility of results of a umbilical cord drug test at the adjudicator hearing,
finding that those test results are admissible under Colorado’s medical treatment
hearsay exception. No. 17CA0460, 2018 WL 1959477, at *2-4 (Colo. App. Apr.
19, 2018).
130
Each state (and sometimes each county within a state) has a different name
for the agency that performs child protective work and oversees the out-of-home
placement of children whose parents are unfit or alleged to be unfit, for ease and
clarity that entity will be referred to as “the agency” throughout this article
regardless of the state or county in question.
131
E.R. at *5. Supra note 128 at *5.
127
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neglect petition. Later at a shelter hearing, the court granted the
agency’s request to return the child to his parents with agency
supervision.132 At that hearing, the court did not ask whether the
child was an Indian child and instead checked the box stating that
“[t]he Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 is not applicable because
the child is not placed out of the home.”133 The case then proceeded
to adjudication and disposition and the mother appealed from the
court’s dispositional order134 because it did not apply ICWA’s
standards.135
Citing to both the 2016 Guidelines and the new regulations,
the appellate court found that the shelter hearing was subject to
ICWA because “ICWA applies to any action that may result in a
foster care placement.” The court then stated that “[f]or the purposes
of ICWA, it is immaterial that the child is not presently placed out
of the home.”136 The opinion explains that in this case, the trial court
might have decided to continue the removal and that because the
court decided to leave the dependency action open, it continued to
have authority to remove the child at any time thereafter.137
Having decided that ICWA applied, the appellate court,
again citing to the 2016 Guidelines and the new regulations, held
that the court erred when it failed to ask whether the child was an
Indian child.138 The applicable federal mandates, the appellate court
reminded, required “the trial court to ask at the commencement of
each child custody proceeding whether any participant knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child” as defined in ICWA.
139
The court then remanded the case with instructions to determine
whether the child was an Indian child and, if the child was identified
132

Id. at *1.
Id.
134
ICWA section 1912’s provisions apply to a “foster care placement” as
defined by the act. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1). Whether the adjudication or
disposition is the “foster care placement” proceeding is a question courts across
the country disagree on. See, e.g., In re Esther V., 149 N.M. 315, 248 P.3d 863
(2011) (finding the adjudication to be the foster care proceeding.
135
E.R., at *1
136
Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
137
Id. (emphasis in original; citing to 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 and 2016 Guidelines at
13).
138
Id.
139
Id. at *5 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) and 2016 Guidelines at 11).
Interestingly, the court also noted that Colorado’s ICWA-Implementing
legislation, §19-1-126(1)–(2), C.R.S. 2017, requires trial courts and child
welfare agencies to inquire into the children’s tribal connections “at the earliest
opportunity.” Id.
133
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as such, to comply with section 1912(a) of ICWA—the section that
regulates notice to tribes in a foster care proceeding.140
Matter of Welfare of S.R.K., 911 N.W. 821 (2018).
In this Minnesota termination of parental rights case, the
parents’ rights were terminated after a QEW signed a notarized
affidavit before trial stating that “[c]ontinued custody of the children
by the parent(s) is likely to result in serious physical and/or
emotional damage to the child,” but testified at trial that she had no
opinion about whether children could be returned to the parents, that
her affidavit remained true, and that she had not honestly considered
the child’s father when preparing the affidavit.141 Both parents
appealed.
The appellate court began by noting that section 1912(f) of
ICWA and the Minnesota Indian Family Protection Act (MIFPA)
counterpart provision, Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subd. 6(a), are
substantively identical.142 Then, the appellate court went on to
interpret those provisions using Minnesota rules of statutory
interpretation,143 finding that the statute was unambiguous:
140

This is of note, because the question of what provisions apply to a shelter
hearing—or any hearing that occurs before the full abuse or neglect
adjudication—is one that states continue to grapple with: some finding section
1922’s emergency removal requirements applicable, others finding section 1912
foster care proceedings requirements applicable. Importantly, the regulations
define emergency proceeding as “any court action that involves an emergency
removal or emergency placement of an Indian child.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.2. Where
the
guidelines state, “[w]hile States use different terminology (e.g., preliminary
protective hearing, shelter hearing) for emergency hearings, the regulatory
definition of emergency proceedings is intended to cover such proceedings as
may be necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.”
Guidelines at 23.
141
Matter of Welfare of S.R.K., 911 N.W.2d 821, 825–26 (2018).
142
Id. at 827–28. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (“No termination of parental
rights may be ordered ... in the absence of a determination, supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert
witnesses that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”) with Minn. Stat. §
260.771, subdiv. 6(a). (“In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court
must determine by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of
a qualified expert witness, that continued custody of the child by the parent ... is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child as defined in
[25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)].”).
143
Id. at 827. As recited by the case, those rules are as follows:
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine
whether the statute's language, on its face, is ambiguous." 500,
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Read straightforwardly, the statute provides that to
terminate parental rights, a district court must
determine that "continued custody of the child by
the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional
or physical damage to the child." 25 U.S.C. 1912(f).
This determination must be supported by evidence
"beyond a reasonable doubt," and part of the
supporting evidence must be QEW testimony. 144
Notably, the appellate court rejected both the State’s
argument—that a QEW must testify but that it need not support the
determination regarding continued custody—and the parents’
argument—that the QEW must specifically testify that to the
language of the continued custody determination.145
The appellate court then found that the testimony of the
QEW supported the finding that continued custody by the mother
would be detrimental to the children and that this evidence coupled
by the other evidence met the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof.146 With regard to the father, however, the court found that
termination had been improper because the agency had failed to
provide testimony from a QEW that supported a finding that
continued custody would be detrimental to the child.147 The court
therefore reversed the termination of the father’s rights.148

LLC v. City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn.
2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A
statute is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation." Id. To determine the plain meaning
of a statute, we will construe the words "according to the rules
of grammar and their common and approved usage." Jones v.
Borchardt, 775 N.W.2d 646, 647 (Minn. 2009); see
also Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2016) (same). We will also "look
to the dictionary definitions of [the] words and apply them in
the context of the statute." State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485,
488 (Minn. 2016).
144
Id. at 830.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 831. Other evidence showed long-term agency involvement, testimony
from a psychologist of mother’s poor life choices belief that the children should
not be returned, and testimony that mother was not engaging in any of the
required services. Id.
147
Id. at 832.
148
Id.
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Diego K. v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvs. 411 P.3d 622
(Alaska, 2018).149
In this Alaska case regarding the standards of removing a
child from the home, the mother and father appealed a superior court
order removing their 16-year-old child, Mary, from their home,
arguing that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) did not meet
the standards required under ICWA.150
In 2014, OCS took emergency custody of the couple’s
children after it received information indicating that their older son
had to be medevac’d out of the village due to alcohol poisoning and
that the entire family abused alcohol.151 After a two day disposition
hearing that began on the last day of December, the court found the
expert witness testimony to be deficient and returned Mary to her
parents, but the court also kept the family under OCS supervision.152
Between January 2015 and April 2016, the court held six status
hearings.153 Those hearings were informal, and no evidence was
admitted. In April 2016, the court held a removal hearing where
OCS called a number of witnesses. The witnesses testified as to
Mary’s absenteeism from school, the social worker’s inability to
address the mold issue in the home, and the social worker’s
unwillingness to work with the father. The village administrator also
testified that the parents were missing their sobriety checks.154 After
the hearing, the court ordered Mary to be removed from the home.
The court based the removal and findings of active efforts on
information provided in the previous hearings.155
The Alaska Supreme Court remanded that order to make
additional removal findings, and the court amended its order to
explain that the findings were based on the previous, unsworn
testimony of the social workers.156 The parents again appealed,
arguing that the findings used to remove Mary from the home could
not be based on unsworn testimony. The Supreme Court agreed,

149

Diego K. v. State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska,
2018).
150
Id. at 624.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 625.
153
Id. at 626.
154
Id. at 627.
155
Id.
156
Id.
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noting that the Alaska Evidence Rules apply in all Child in Need of
Aid (CINA) cases.157
The Alaska Supreme Court discussed the relatively informal
nature of CINA cases and the need for multiple parties to
communicate throughout the case, including parents, attorneys,
guardians ad litem, and social workers and how courts may choose
to schedule informal hearings for updates. However, when the
discussion at the hearing shifts from updates to making specific legal
and factual findings, the court held that those findings must be based
on admitted evidence.158 The court also held that the parents’
preserved this issue for appeal, both by objecting to testimony and
by requesting that the court swear in a witness.159 In addition, the
parents could not have known at the time of testimony that the court
would later rely on that unsworn evidence to make removal findings
four months later.160 The Alaska Supreme Court vacated the
removal order and remanded the case back to superior court.
In re B.Y., 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2018).
In this Montana termination of parental rights case, neither
the hearing transcripts nor written orders discuss how the agency
had made active efforts before removal and termination.161 Notably,
the appellate court found that the trial court correctly applied ICWA
because there was “reason to know” the children were Indian
children as indicated in the agency’s affidavits. The appellate court
also noted that although the agency served relevant tribes with
requests to determine the membership status and eligibility of the
children, one of the tribes never replied. The appellate court then
held that without an answer from that tribe, the trial court correctly
determined that the case should proceed as though ICWA
applied. The father appealed.
After reciting the 2016 ICWA regulations, the appellate
court stated that under ICWA, “the district court must document in
detail in the record how active efforts have been made by clear and
convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable
doubt prior to termination,” and because the trial court in this
157

Id. at 629.
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
In re B.Y., 432 P.3d 129, 130 (Mont. 2018);
158
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instance had failed to provide that documentation, it erred.162 The
court then vacated the termination order and remanded the matter
“for the court to ‘document in detail’ if the [agency ]met its burden
of providing ‘active efforts’ by clear and convincing evidence prior
to removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination.”  
V.  

ALL REPORTED STATE CASES

As a federal law implemented by state courts, ICWA holds
a unique place in child welfare jurisprudence. Included below is a
comprehensive listing of all reported 2018 state and federal cases
involving ICWA. This quick reference should allow busy
practitioners to quickly find and review all new case law on any
given ICWA topic that may arise in their caseload without the
tedious work of searching through fifty jurisdictions and numerous
topics.
Cases that were not reported and reported cases that only
mention ICWA to clarify that the child involved was not ICWAeligible have not been included.
Case Name
Active Efforts
In re B.Y.
Adoption of Micah H.
v. Tyler, R. (In re
Adoption of Micah
H.)
Appealability
In re Interest of
M.R.M.

Citation

Named Tribe1

Outcome

Party Appealing

432 P.3d 129 (Mont.
2018)
918 N.W.2d 834 (Neb.
2018)

Unknown

Remand

Father

Oglala Sioux
Tribe

Affirmed

Father

No. 17CA0255, 2018
WL 549513 (Colo. App.
2018)

Unnamed

Affirmed

Mother

Appointment of Counsel
162

Id. at 131.
The “named tribe” is the most specific information available in the case. When
a tribe is named it indicates that there is “reason to believe” the child might be
an Indian child. If the tribe is “unnamed,” this means that the tribe’s name does
not appear in the case. If the tribe is “unknown,” this means that the parent does
not know the tribe’s name but has stated there is an affiliation.
1
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B.L.L.S. v. B.S. (In re
Interest of B.L.L.S)
Burden of Proof
In re Interest of M.V.

557 S.W.3d 486 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2018)

Affirmed

Mother and Father

Remand

Mother

Remand

Father

237 Cal.Rptr.3d 915
Karuk Tribe
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
No. 17CA0460, 2018
Unknown
WL 1959477 (Colo. App.
2018)

Affirmed

Father

Remand

Mother

921 N.W.2d 463 (S.D.
2018)

Oglala Sioux
Tribe

Affirmed

Father

Nos. 341100, 341101,
2018 WL 4339705
(Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
557 S.W.3d 511
(Missouri Ct. App. 2018)
432 P.3d 149 (Mont.
2018)
414 P.3d 768 (Mont.
2018)
419 P.3d 374 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2018)

Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe

Remand

Mother and Father

Cherokee Nation

Affirmed

Mother and Father

Arapahoe Tribe

Affirmed

Mother

Chippewa Cree
Tribe
Choctaw

Remand

Mother

Reverse

Mother

228 Cal.Rptr.3d 213
(Cal. Ct. App 2018)
238 Cal.Rptr.3d 871
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

Redtail Tribe

Remand

Mother

Apache

Remand

Mother and Father

432 P.3d 628 (Colo. App. Sioux
2018)

Consent to Termination
In re Williams
915 N.W.2d 328 (Mich.
2018)

Foster Care
Proceeding
K.L. v. A.A. (In re
K.L.)
In re E.R.

Guardianship
In re Guardianship of
I.L.J.E.
Indian Child
In re Beers
B.B.S. v. B.T.S. (In re
Interest of B.S.S.)
In re J.J.C.
In re L.D.
J.W.E v. State (In re
J.W.E.)
Inquiry
In re Elizabeth M.

In re E.R.

	
  

Cherokee Nation
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Sault Ste Marie
Tribe of
Chippewa
Indians

	
  

State v. J.L. (In re
Interest of J.L.)

428 P.3d 612 (Colo. App. Kiowa
2018)

Remand

Mother

433 P.3d 114 (Colo. App. Unknown
2018)

Reverse

Father

434 P.3d 598 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2018)

Dismissed Mother

In re Interest of L.M.
Jurisdiction
Holly C.v. Tohono
O'odham Nation
Notice
Crouch v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs.
Lawrence v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human
Servs.
N.G. v. S.A. (In re
N.G.)

Tohono
O'odham

547 S.W.3d 102 (Ark. Ct. Cherokee
App. 2018)
548 S.W.3d 192 (Ark. Ct. Unnamed
App. 2018)

Affirmed

Mother

Affirmed

Mother

238 Cal.Rptr.3d 304
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

Cherokee

Remand

Mother

238 Cal. Rptr.3d 1 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2018)

Tohono
O'odham

Remand

Mother

432 P.3d 628 (Colo. App. Lakota
2018)
431 P.3d 663 (Colo. Ct.
Navajo-Dine
App. 2018)

Remand

Mother

Remand

Mother

No. 16JV2312019 WL
762562 (Colo. Ct. App.
Feb. 21, 2019)
429 P.3d 629 (Mont.
2018)

Cherokee

Remand

Father

Chippewa Cree
Tribe

Remand

Mother

423 P.3d 586 (Mont.
2018)
239 Cal. Rptr.3d 493
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

Blackfeet Tribe

Remand

Mother

Wichita

Affirmed

Mother and Father

818 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2018)

Cherokee

Remand

Mother

E.H. v. Sally H. (In re
E.H.)
In re Interest of M.V.
In re Interest of L.H.
In re Interest of I.B-R.

In re L.A.G.
In re D.E.
C.A. v. C.T. (In re
C.A.)
In re A.P.
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Placement Preferences
Day v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs.

562 S.W. 3d 871 (Ark.
Ct. App. 2018)

Cherokee Nation

Affirmed

Mother

920 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.
2018)

Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe

Affirmed

Father

Spirit Lake

Affirmed
in Part
Reversed
in Part

Mother and Father

411 P.3d 576 (Alaska
2018)

Native Village
of Tuluksak

Remand

State

411 P.3d 622 (Alaska
2018)

Unnamed
(Asa'carsarmiut)

Remand

Mother and Father

433 P.3d 1064 (Alaska
2018)

Native Village
of Yakutat

Affirmed

Mother

548 S.W.3d 865 (Ark. Ct. Cherokee Nation
App. 2018)

Affirmed

Mother

547 S.W. 3d 111 (Ark.
Ct. App. 2018)

Choctaw Nation

Affirmed

Mother

236 Cal.Rptr.3d 220
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

Cherokee Nation

Affirmed

Mother and Father

424 P.3d 619 (Mont.
2018)

Fort Peck

Affirmed

Father

417 P.3d 342 (Mont.
2018)

Fort Peck

Affirmed

Father

431 P.3d 381 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2018)

Choctaw Nation

Affirmed

Mother

In re Interest of M.D.
Qualified Expert Witness
In re Welfare of
911 N.W.2d 821 (Minn.
S.R.K.
2018)

Removal
Alaska Dep’t of
Human Servs. v.
Michelle P.
Diego K. v. Alaska
Dep’t of Health &
Social Servs.
Demetria H. v. Alaska
Dep’t of Health and
Soc. Servs.
Harjo v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs.
Swangel v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs.
Collin E. v. H.S. (In re
Collin E.)
In re P.T.D.
In re A.L.D.
V.D. v. Black (In re
V.D.)
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In re Interest of A.M.
In re Interest of J.L.C.

No. 08-18-00105-CV,
2018 WL 6583392 (Tex.
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018)
No. 07-18-00052-CV,
2018 WL 3524749 (Tex.
App. 2018)
904 N.W.2d 479 (N.D.
2018)

Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo

Affirmed

Mother

Choctaw Nation
of Oklahoma

Affirmed

Mother and Father

Unnamed

Affirmed

Father

Reverse

Guardian ad
Litem

Affirmed

Mother

Affirmed

Mother and Father

In re Interest of
K.S.D.
Transfer to Tribal Court
In re C.J., Jr.
108 N.E.3d 677 (Ohio Ct. Gila River
App. 2018)
Indian
Community
J.Y. v. R.T. (In re
241 Cal.Rptr.3d 856
Pit River Indian
J.Y.)
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
Tribe
A.S. v. C.S. (In re
239 Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Mesa Grande
A.S.)
Ct. App. 2018)
Band of Mission
Indians
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